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Abstract 
 
Newton’s basic ideas developed and evolved throughout his career and 
changed in sometimes surprisingly profound ways. In this paper I propose 
an outline of the evolution of Newton's conceptual framework by following 
the development of his ideas throughout the early work preceding the first 
edition of the Principia, and thus to complete the work that has been done 
by Whiteside and Ruffner with respect to Newton’s mechanics. I shall 
show that these evolutions — the mechanical and the metaphysical — are 
closely interrelated. My focus will be on a key text that marks a turning 
point both from the metaphysical and the methodological point of view: 
the “De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum”. Rather than looking upon 
it as an isolated fact, I establish the connections of this text to other 
manuscripts from the same period, primarily the manuscript “Elements of 
Mechanicks” in the Hall & Hall edition, as well as the two variants of the 
“De Motu”, to which it can be said to relate as to a “zero release”.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is known that the period of Newton’s lifetime between 1679 and 
1694 was filled with intellectual transition and turmoil. 
Nevertheless, relatively little work has been done on explicit 
attempts to outline the specific paths and turns followed by his 
conceptual development throughout this same period.2 Indeed, a 
                                                
1 FUND-CLEA, Dept. of Mathematics, Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Open 
Universiteit Nederland, Faculty of Cultural Studies.  
 
2 With regard to his mechanics D. T. Whiteside, “Before the Principia,” 
Journal for the History of Astronomy, 1, 1970, pp. 5–19, and J.A. Ruffner, 
“Newton’s Propositions on Comets: Steps in Transition, 1681–84”, Archive 
for the History of Exact Science, 54, 2000, pp. 259–277. J.W. Herrivel’s 
book, although critically assessed by Whiteside, remains the source for 
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certain bias towards an “ahistorical” reading of Newton’s works, 
especially those concerning natural philosophy, continues to prevail. 
This may be somewhat of a surprise in the light of the 
overwhelming richness of the material that allows for a more critical 
approach:  
 
The conventional view of the prehistory of Newton’s synthesis in 
the Principia of his predecessors’ work in planetary theory and 
terrestrial gravitation is still not seriously changed from that which 
Newton himself chose to impose on his contemporaries at the end 
of his life.3  
 
Simon Schaffer has discussed at length and in depth the origins of 
biases of this kind, and the traps which they lay out on the way of 
the historian or philosopher engaged in the exercise of “Newtonian 
hermeneutics”: a different reading is not neccesarily a wrong one. 
Interpretation is an accomplishment and this accomplishment is the 
historian’s explanandum.4 I happily second that, but add the caveat 
that some interpretations might nevertheless be better than other 
                                                                                                                                      
young Newton’s attempts in dynamics: The background to Newton’s 
Principia. A study of Newton’s dynamical researches in the years 1664-
1684, based on original manuscripts from the Portsmouth Collection in the 
Library of the University of Cambridge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1965. The only systematic treatment that links practical work in science to 
developing metaphysical ideas with Newton is B.J.T. Dobbs, The Janus 
Face of Genius, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. On the 
other hand, a vivid interest in the relation between Newton’s theology and 
his natural philosophy exists. As a guide through this literature, the reader 
can start with S. Snobelen, “‘To discourse of God’: Isaac Newton's 
heterodox theology and his natural philosophy", in P.B. Wood (ed.), 
Science and dissent in England, 1688-1945, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, 
pp. 39-65. 
3 D.T. Whiteside, “Newton’s Early Thoughts on Planetary Motion: a Fresh 
Look”, The British Journal for the History of Science, 2, 6, 1964, pp. 118-
137. 
4 S. Schaffer, “Comets & Idols: Newton’s cosmology and Political 
Theology”, in: P. Theerman and A.F. Seeff, Action and reaction. 
Proceedings of a Symposium to Commemorate the Tercentenary of 
Newton’s Principia, University of Delaware Press, Newark, 1993. 
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ones, especially those which do not only take the different 
audiences addressed5, but also the different stages of attestable 
conceptual development of the author into account, his own 
intellectual history, so to say. In that context, issues of dating and 
interrelation of manuscripts and published works take on another 
meaning than merely that of strategies in an interpretative debate. 
For this reason an editorial method has been established long ago 
which gives the researcher access to comparable text sources, 
provided with a critical apparatus. Saidly enough, no such critical 
editions exist in the field of Newton studies up to to-day, probably 
testifying to the fact that this field is even more infected by the 
disease of “hermeneutical essentialism” than other, related ones, 
say, the study of authors from the same period, like Galilei, 
Descartes, Huygens, or Leibniz. 
 
Symptomatic for this situation — as Schaffer himself points out6 — 
are the widely diverging dates ascribed to a text which is clearly of 
key importance, the De Gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum (On 
Gravity and the aequilibrium of fluids). This text, its title 
notwithstanding, deals first and foremost with a thorough criticism 
of the metaphysical positions elaborated by Descartes in his 
Principia Philosophiae.7 Hall & Hall, who published the DG text with 
a translation8, as well as McGuire in his edition of an equally 
                                                
5 More recent work on this issue has been done by R. Iliffe, e.g., “Abstract 
considerations: disciplines, audiences and the incoherence of Newton's 
natural philosophy”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 
March 2003. 
6 S. Schaffer, o.c., p. 208. 
7 R. Descartes, “Principia Philosophiae”, in Oeuvres complètes de R. 
Descartes, Tome VIII-I,  C. Adam et P. Tannery (eds.), Cerf, Paris, 1897- 
1913.  
8 A. Rupert Hall and M. Boas Hall (eds.), Unpublished Scientific Papers of 
Isaac Newton, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1962.  
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enigmatic manuscript9, qualify it as “youthful” (around 1670), while 
Janiak in his new translation situates it around 1680.10 Recently, 
Edward Richards even argued that the DG is to be placed after the 
Principia!11 My aim in this paper is to show that Newton wrote the 
De Gravitatione in the same period he was working on the comets 
during the years 1681-1684, and more specifically around 1682-
1683. I furthermore establish the close links it entertains both by 
content and method to the different De Motu drafts and to the first 
published edition of the Principia (1687). The fact that Newton’s 
ideas on cometary motion underwent drastic changes in the period 
of the De motu drafts has been thematised again by Schaffer in the 
second part of the paper quoted above. His perspective, however, is 
the theologically steered cosmology Newton starts to develop during 
that same period and the active rôle comets play therein. Schaffer 
hints at the physical import of this theological scheme, but places 
its elaboration much later and on a more speculative level.12 We 
shall see how the question of comets directly leads to the first 
edition of the Principia, because it made unavoidable the 
                                                
9 Following usage, I shall label it after its first words Tempus et Locus. See 
McGuire, “Newton on Place, Time and God: an Unpublished source”, The 
British Journal for the History of science, 11, 38, 1978, pp. 114-129. 
10 I. Newton, Philosophical Writings, A. Janiak (ed.), Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2004. 
11 E.T. Richards, A Philosophical Analysis of Newton’s Arguments against 
Cartesianism as found in ‘De Gravitatione’, Doctoral Dissertation, Boston 
University, 2006. 
12 Because Newton made comets’ tails the bearers of celestial activity, he 
had to explain how they worked in void space. Both Gregory and Henry 
Pemberton, editor of the third edition of the Principia, found trouble 
making sense of this thought. (...) Using his alchemical and matter 
theoretic drafts of the 1670s, reworking the initial Definitions to the 
Principia on transmutation of matter, and adding queries to successive 
editions of the Opticks after 1704, Newton spelled out the various ways in 
which the activity of the cosmos could be sustained by the rare fluids 
carried by comets. We shall see below how this impinges directly on 
another important shift in Newton’s ideas on methodology which will 
follow soon after the publication of PR I, in the early 1690s. For the quote, 
see S. Schaffer, o.c., pp. 218-219. 
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fundamental rejection of both the physics and the metaphysics of 
Descartes.  
 
I thus want to contribute something to the outline of a 
comprehensive map of evolution of Newton’s views up to the advent 
of the first Principia by studying the contextus of this text in some 
detail. It will appear that Cohen’s advise is applicable more 
generally when it comes to the relation between “science” and 
“philosophy” in Newton’s early years: 
 
 (..) to understand Newton’s philosophy of science, one must not 
characterise his early and most creative periods of scientific 
thought by later slogans such as “Hypotheses non fingo”. Rather 
we must see Newton’s thought in its development as he 
progressed from a tolerance of certain types of hypotheses, 
especially speculations as to the cause of phenomena, to an 
alledged abhorrence of them all.13  
 
The De Gravitatione played a pivotal rôle in the decisive 
metaphysical shift Newton made away from Cartesianism shortly 
before he set out to write his Principia. It also bears witness to his 
taking the first, still hestitant, steps towards what will become only 
much later, in the second and third edition of the Principia, his 
celebrated Philosophia experimentalis. 
 
Some textual interrelationships 
 
The ahistorical bias metioned above is obviously what led the Halls 
and McGuire into believing that the DG is a youthful work belonging 
to his “student days”14, while this is plainly impossible when placed 
                                                
13 I.B. Cohen, “Hypotheses in Newton’s Philosophy”, Physis, VIII, 1966, p. 
163. 
14 Hall & Hall, p. 75. 
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side by side to a text of which the early origin is indubitable, e.g. 
the Lawes of Motion. Hall & Hall state (on p. 76 of their 
introduction): Both this short paper and n° 2, ‘De gravitatione et 
aequipondio fluidorum’ appear to spring from Newton’s critical 
reaction to the Principia Philosophiae of Descartes. And this may 
well be the case, for we know with certainty that Newton read 
Descartes’s Principia already as a student15, but it does not 
therefore follow that they have been written in the same period, 
with the same intention, nor necessarily in an early phase of his 
lifetime. This is nevertheless their point with regard to them: Nos. 1 
and 2 clearly antidate the Principia by many years (p. 75). There 
are  a few interesting similarities between both these tracts and the 
Principia, like the characterisation of the motion of bodies as their 
passing out of  one place or part of space into another, through all 
ye intermediate space is their motion.16 There also is the link of 
force to the moving body’s “bulk” (in itself an early, imprecise 
precusor of his later concept of “mass”). But the criticism of 
Descartes in Lawes is implicit, and focused on the mathematical 
description of the “rules of Reflection” for “absolutely hard” bodies. 
There is no trace of a rejection of the spatial aether17, on the 
                                                
15 J.E. McGuire and M. Tamny, Certain Philosophical Questions. Newton’s 
Trinity Notebook [TNB in what follows], Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2002 [1983], p. 127 sq.  “The Cartesian Influence”). 
16 Lawes, Hall & Halll, p. 157. 
17 The statement at the beginning of the first paragraph (“There is a 
uniform extension, are expansion continued every way without bounds: in 
which all bodies are, each in severall parts of it”) cannot suffice for 
making such a claim. As McGuire and Tamny remark in their commentary 
on the Trinity Notebook, a collection of even earlier texts: There is more, 
of course, to a theory of absolute space than the conception of void and 
penetrable expanses that lack resistance to motion. To be sure, these 
features will characterise any conception of space that can be said to 
‘contain’ the movements of corporeal existents. But more then this, the 
categorical nature of space must be considered. Is it a substance or 
an accident? Or does its mode of existence differ from the traditional 
categories of being? What is the connection determined relative to the 
senses and motions with respect to insensible space itself? They add in ft. 
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contrary, it is stated unambigiously that [bodies’] motions are 
continually impeded by ye mediums in which they move18, while the 
criticism of Descartes in de DG is explicit and aimed at the very 
foundations of his metaphysical framework. This profound 
difference is matched by an equally profound difference in style. On 
the one hand the schoolish manner in which the tract on ‘Lawes’ is 
composed, with quaestiones to solve (“Now to know the real 
quantity...”; “now... to know how these bodies shall be reflected”) 
in the abbreviated, formalistic style which still was prevalent in 
university education in Newton’s student days.19 There is nothing in 
the DG that matches this stylistic mark to any comparable extend. 
Moreover the hesitant, unprecise phrasing of basic concepts of 
metaphysical import in Lawes: [bodies] have a relenting softenesse 
& springynesse which makes their contact be for some time & in 
more points then one20 as contrasted to the sec and self-assured 
formulations (“Hactenus de natura corporea”21) on, e.g., the 
impenetrability of matter in the DG. The point for Newton in Lawes 
is that Descartes's theory of how objects move through a medium 
— their percussions and reflections are therefore involved — does 
not hold on purely mathematical grounds (Newton succeeds for the 
first time in the construction of the parallelogram of forces). But 
Lawes still completely thinks in terms of an aether. De Gravitatione, 
apart from positing right from the start that mathematical 
philosophy is superior to mere natural philosophy, sets out to 
                                                                                                                                      
213: These questions are systematically considered in De gravitatione. 
McGuire & Tamny, o.c., p. 124 (my bold).  
18 Hall & Hall, p. 163. 
19 And even went through a revival at Cambridge. Cfr. S. Mandelbrote’s 
remarks on the restauration of the Divinity Act by the mid 1670s Regius 
Professor J. Beaumont, Master of Peterhouse, during a lecture “Becoming 
heterodox in seventeenth-century Cambridge: the case of Isaac Newton”, 
held at a workshop at the Belgian Royal Academy in Brussels, september 
2007. 
20 Hall & Hall, p. 163. 
21 Hall & Hall, p. 111. 
 8 
develop a sound fluid mechanics as a basis for a “system of the 
world”, and then turns — at first sight a contradiction between the 
formal and the metaphysical content of the DG — to the systematic 
development of the notion of a physical vacuum into the 
metaphysical absolute space which functions as the global system 
of reference, as opposed to the local one of relative motion of 
bodies referring to themselves only: 
 
 Corporum positiones, distantiae, et motus locales ad spatij partes 
referenda sunt. (...) Denique spatium est eternae durationis et 
immutabilis naturae, idque quod sit aeternus et immutabilis entis 
effectus emanativus.22  
 
There is no real contradiction, however: Newton comes to realise 
fully and completely the untenability of Descartes’s metaphysical 
positions only when he tries to work them out into a sound 
mathematical theory that is able to decribe facts — like, as we will 
see, cometary motions — hence the critcism of Descartes’s Principia 
in the main part of DG. The Tempus and Motus texts indeed relate 
to this; they take up and refine the arguments of DG, as McGuire 
reckons and elaborates in detail, but because of his dating of DG 
(between 1666-1670) it is impossible for him to appreciate the 
change Newton’s ideas underwent. 
 
Significantly, the manuscript (Tempus et Locus) is also based on 
De gravitatione. This important treatise was written somewhere 
between 1666 and 1670. It constitutes an important set of 
criticisms of Descartes (...) Moreover, it represents Newton’s most 
philosophical account of his doctrines of absolute motion, place, 
                                                
22 Hall & Hall, p. 104. 
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space and time. At every turn, Newton’s characteritic theories are 
developed in oppostion to Descartes’.23  
 
One wonders how the distinguished editor of both this text and of 
the Trinity Notebook with its references to the 1675 Oldenburg 
letter and the 1682 de Cometis ms. ULC 3965 (see further) could 
have failed to see the apparent contradiction. I believe this is a 
consequence of the bias according to which Newton did not have to 
go through any real intellectual evolution; he was born destined to 
destroy the Cartesian fantasies from the start. Indeed, the above 
contradiction dissappears entirely once you see that the only thing 
wrong is the date ascribed to DG. From the moment it is accepted 
that DG must have been written somewhere around 1683, 
everything falls into place, and the ensuing statement obtains its 
full impact: 
 
Without the stimulus of Descartes’ philosophy it is doubtful whether 
Newton’s thinking would have found the kind of expression which is 
revealed in De gravitatione. Nor is this the end of the Frenchman’s 
influence: a careful comparison of the structure of the scholium on 
space and time with De gravitatione shows that it is based on the 
latter.24 
 
The need for a reading of the De Gravitatione as a whole 
 
I believe that Newton’s idea about the system of the world up to 
then had remained “Cartesian” in the sense that it was based on the 
                                                
23 McGuire, Tempus et Locus, p. 124. The Tempus et Locus fragments 
themselves fit in the post-Principia period, probably from 1695 onwards, 
when he was drafting his first versions of the General Scholium. This 
latter text features remarkable resemblances to the DG in many respects, 
especially when its drafts are taken into account. For SG’s prehistory, see 
S. Ducheyne, “The General Scholium: Some Notes on Newton's Published 
and Unpublished Endeavours”, Lias: Sources and Documents Relating to 
the Early Modern History of Ideas, 33, 3, 2006, pp. 223-274. 
24 McGuire, Tempus et Locus, p. 124. 
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aethers in the vortices of the Sun and Planets.25 As late as 1682, he 
can write materium coelorum fluidam esse. Materiam coelorum 
circa centrum systematis cosmici secundum cursam planetarum 
gyrare.26 His critical attitude towards Cartesianism – already evident 
in de early Trinity Notebook – does not yet affect his adherence to 
its theoretical foundation. On the contrary, in the DG he initially 
sets out to develop a sound mathematical basis for the mechanical 
theory of motion based on it, the behaviour of bodies in a fluid 
medium, fostered — I claim — by his studies of the comets.27 The 
De Gravitatione plainly testifies to Newton’s struggle to get fluid 
mechanics right and his failure, which forces him into an in-depth 
and detailed re-examination, and ultimately rejection, of its 
theoretical foundations as laid out in a scholarly manner by 
Descartes in his Principia Philosophiae. This point was already made 
by Biarnais in her 1985 translation: 
 
 A cet égard, Le De Gravitatione et et Aequipondio fluidorum 
représente le point culminant de ces remarques, en tant que 
réflexion méthodique sur les fondéments de la science mécanique 
(...) Pourquoi enfin “science de l’équilibre des fluides et des solides 
dans les fluides”? Car, précisement, le Système du monde en 
honneur à l’époque bien que fort discuté est la théorie cartésienne 
                                                
25 Letter to Oldenburg, 1675, reprinted in H. W. Turnbull, J. F. Scott, A. R. 
Hall, and L. Tilling (eds.), The Correspondence of Isaac Newton, ed. 7 
vols., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1959–1984., vol. I, p. 368. 
26 ULC Add. 3965.14, fl. 613r. This Ms. has been published in facsimile 
and transcribed with translation by Ruffner in his already cited paper, as 
Propositiones de Cometis, pp. 260-263. The statement is also quoted in 
TNB, p. 169 ft. 120. 
27The link to the comets I owe to Ruffner’s paper: Isaac Newton’s closest 
approach to a system of the world in the critical period 1681–84 is 
provided in a set of untitled propositions concerning comets, p. 259. 
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des tourbillons où il est fait appel aux propirétés des fluides pour 
rendre compte du transport des planètes dans l’univers.28  
 
It did not make its way into mainstream scholarship, however, as 
can be inferred from the fact that Newton’s manuscript is chopped 
into “philosophical” and “physical” pieces by commentators and 
translators until to-day.29 His systematic discussion of Descartes’s 
Principia is far from a mere digression, leading very far from the 
announced subject of hydrostatics30, even though Newton himself 
calls it a “digression” towards the end.31 This qualification indeed 
testifies for the fact that he himself had not planned to go there 
from the start, for he had not yet fully swallowed the consequences 
of his own theoretical discoveries. It wouldn’t take long, however, 
before he understood that a farewell to Descartes also meant a 
farewell to fluid dynamics as a basis for a system of the world: 
 
Newton clearly intended to write an elaborate treatise on 
hydrostatics; but, after completing a long criticism of Descartes, 
he seems to have lost interest in his original purpose.32  
 
Again, why would that be? Because a metaphysics based on empty 
space requires a mechanics that operates in vacuo. His abandoning 
of the hydrostatic project was thus far more than a mere caprice. 
 
                                                
28 I. Newton, De la  gravitation, ou les fondements de la mécanique 
classique, M.-F. Biarnais (ed.), Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1985, 
Introduction, pp. 9-10. 
29 The extend to which this approach is unfruitful becomes clear when one 
keeps the example of the General Scholium in mind. Cfr. De Smet, R., 
Verelst, K., "Newton’s Scholium Generale. The Platonic and Stoic legacy: 
Philo, Justus Lipsius and the Cambridge Platonists", History of  Science, 
xxxix, 2001. 
30 So Hall & Hall in their introduction, p. 89. 
31 Hall & Hall, p. 114. 
32 Hall & Hall, p. 76. 
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Interestingly enough, this is confirmed by the fact that Newton’s 
criticism in DG does not start with Cartesian mechanism. The set of 
definitions exposed at the start by no means imply the vacuum, let 
alone absolute space. He comes to this point only after having 
critically discussed the Scholastic approach to body as as substance 
with sensible qualities on methodological grounds.33 The 
methodological stance Newton occupies in the De Gravitatione is 
interesting, but equally ambiguous. In the introducing paragraphs, 
he clearly sees mathematisation as an alternative to dialectics as 
the “pure science” by which truths can be deduced from first 
principles. This he takes directly from Descartes, whose rupture 
with the ancient ars inveniendi consists precisely in the replacement 
of logic by mathematics.34 The truly novel element here is that 
mathematics may be applied to making clear many of the 
phenomena of natural philosophy.35 Experiment comes in not only 
to illustrate but, by demonstrating their applicability, to confirm the 
certainty of the mathematical principles used. There is still a long 
way to go to Newton’s later empiricism! The difference between 
natural phlosophy and mathematics is codified stylistically: 
experimental results are discussed in scholia, a mode of 
presentation proper to the more informal realm of natural 
philosophy, while the deductive part of Newton’s scheme relies on 
mathematical rigour. This complies to some points raised by Smith 
in his analysis of the methodology of the first Principia: there (in the 
Introduction) a rare but clear statement on the key rôle of empirical 
data (“phaenomena”) is made, while at the same time mathematics 
                                                
33 A point that does not come out very well in the translation proposed by 
Janiak, pp. 12-14. 
34 It is arithmetic and geometry, the two subjects of pure mathematics, 
that Descartes extols instead of dialectic or logic. C. Sasaki, Descartes’s 
Mathematical Thought, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2003, p. 178. Newton could 
have learned this from Desacrtes’s Principia, as well as from his 
mathematical works.  
35 In Janiak’s translation, p. 12.
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is said to enhance the possibility to argue more securely in natural 
philosophy.36 The full transition to experimental philosophy in the 
true sense of the word will take place only afterwards, between the 
first and the second edition of the Principia, although its Ansatz is 
already present in the De Gravitatione.37 Thus, from the 
methodological point of view, PR I occupies an intermediate position 
between DG and the later PR-editions, as it does in many more 
respects, as shall be discussed below.  
 
A cluster of structurally related pre-Principia manuscripts 
 
Newton had been incited by the correspondence with Hooke in 1679 
(as he himself recognises in a letter to Halley) to resume work on 
the problem of planetary motion.38 At that moment he continued to 
adhere to the idea of the heavenly fluids as the cause of 
gravitaional force. What might have brought him to change his 
fundamental stance on his version of the Cartesian aether? I think 
Ruffner provides a key to the answer in his commentary on a most 
intriguing manuscript dealing with a subject that had attracted 
Newton’s curiosity already at the beginning of his scientific career: 
the problems the dynamical behaviour of comets implied for 
Cartesian vortex theory.39 Newton had been doing observations on 
the comet of 1680 and entered in correspondence about it with the 
then Astronomer Royal, N. Flamsteed, during the years 1680-1681. 
                                                
36 G.W. Smith, “The Methodology of the Principia”, in: I.B. Cohen and 
G.W. Smtih, The Cambridge companion to Newton, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 138-173. 
37 A. Shapiro, “Newton's Experimental Philosophy”, Early Modern Science 
and Medicine, 9, 3, 2004, pp. 185–217. 
38 The case is discussed in extenso in D.T. Whiteside, Prehistory, pp. 24-
28. 
39 E.g. the “retrograde” trajectories followed by comets with respect to the 
“natural vortex” around the sun, as well as the impossibility of the 
observed orientation of a comet’s tail when compared to the direction of 
the motion of its body in a space filled with a liquid aether, especially in 
the sun’s neighbourhood. See Whiteside, Prehistory; Ruffner, Comets.  
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But the observations jotted down on that occasion clearly sparked 
of deeper reflections on the nature of the problems involved. This 
was a scheme witnessed before. In his student days Newton had 
already worked on comets: 
 
What sparked his interest in things astronomical? The appearance 
of a comet in late 1664 (...) This he again observed several times 
some weeks after it was egressed. Afterwards (...) [w]hat underly 
the visible appearance of the heavens came instead to fill his 
mind.40 
 
Already in 1664 Newton noticed the problematic nature of cometary 
motion.41 His renewed interest in the mathematical properties of 
planetary motion — fostered by the corrsepondence with Hooke — 
added to the acuity of his thoughts on observations made on the 
comet of 1680-1, and his discussion about it with Flamsteed. 
Indeed, the Ms. produced by Ruffner gives on at least two occasions 
rise to a profound criticism of Descartes: his theory of light with 
respect to the visibility and his theory of motion with respect to the 
orientation of the tail of a comet, especially in the neighbourhood of 
the sun: 
 
 The document adds perspective to several areas of Newton 
Scholarship including his reconsiderations of comets according to 
the laws of planetary motion following his correspondence with 
Flamsteed in 1681; his achievements following the 
correspondence with Hooke in 1679, especially the use of Kepler’s 
                                                
40 D.T. Whiteside, “The Prehistory of the Principia from 1664 to 1586”, 
Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, 45, 1, 1991, pp. 11-
66. The quote is on p. 17.  
41 Even when his interest shifted over the 1670 to work, apart from 
alchemy and theology, on light and colours, these problems remain 
present at the back of his mind. Witness his 1679 attempt to sketch out a 
(fully Cartesian) lunar theory. Cfr. Whiteside, “Prehistory”, p. 17-18. 
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area law; his views on the properties of aether in the early 
1680s.42  
 
I think that Newton decided to write out fluid dynamics properly 
(i.e., in the mathematical way) in order to be able to deal with 
these problems, but failed. This is what happens in De Gravitatione, 
and it cannot have happened elsewhere than in between 1682 (date 
of the de Cometis) and 1684 (date of De Motu 1, in which the new 
vacuum mechanics is outlined for the first time), because once 
Newton realises that fluid mechanics is not fit to be the sound basis 
for a system of the world, the next steps follow quickly. The 
mathematical development of a theory of motion based on the new 
metaphysics he devised in DG as a consequence of his decisive 
rejection of Descartes, is resumed from scratch in the manucript 
known as the De Motu 1, probably as a direct consequence of 
Halley’s visit in 168443, and which will amount into the first edition 
of the Principia, as explained by Cohen in his Introduction.44  
 
I shall not analyse in detail the way the definitions (axioms, 
hypotheses) carry over from DG in the different variants of DM, 
although that would in itself be a relevant and rewarding exercise. 
Suffice it to lift out some remarkable points (I base myself on the 
facsimile edition offered by Whiteside45). In the final, often 
neglected, part of the De Gravitatione, Newton for a short while 
resumes the original hydrostatic project with which the treatise 
                                                
42 J.A. Ruffner, “Comets”, p. 262. 
43 Who up to that moment was still on terms of friendly collaboration with 
his later enemy Flamsteed, and might as well have heard through him 
about their correspondence. 
44 I.B. Cohen, Introduction to Newton’s Principia, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambdrige, 1971. 
45 D.T. Whiteside, The preliminary manucripts for Isaac Newton’s 1987 
Principia 1684-1686, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. 
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began. He formulates a set of nineteen definitions46 which deal 
primarily with the different kinds of forces (“powers”), their 
“intension” and “extension”, and the way they interact with bodies. 
There is not yet any mention of “vacuum” or “absolute space” 
(remember we are dealing with an attempt to consistently 
reformulate the remnants of Cartesian mechanics, as is plain from 
the comment to def. 1547). Now let us turn to the mss. of De Motu. 
There are several documents related to DM 1, the “mothercopy” of 
which is the tract De motu corporum in gyrum.  The same is true 
for DM 2, to which the De motu corporum liber primus forms the 
base. Not only do the (earlier, 1684) tracts of DM 1 all start with 
sets of definitons relating to kinds of forces and their interaction 
with bodies, but the attempt by Newton to systematise them (in the 
tract De motu corporum in mediis regulariter cedentibus48) follows 
exactly the pattern laid out in de DG, with 19 definitions that 
express the fundamental concepts.49 Of course they differ of those 
in DG by content -, this is the first time that “tempus absolutus”, 
“tempus relativus”, “spatium absolutum” and “spatium relativum” 
appear (defs. 1-4). That they are intended as an explicit revision of 
the concepts used in DG is indubitably clear from the verso side of 
the first folio of the DM in mediis manuscript, where the summing 
up of definitions is interrupted, and a list appears that retakes the 
list of concepts with which DG starts. It is the differences that are 
revealing: 
                                                
46 Hall & Hall, pp. 148-152 in their English translation of DG. 
47 Certainly it suits mathematicians to contemplate things in the light of 
such reasoning, or if you prefer in the Peripathetic manner; but in physics 
things seem otherwise. Hall & Hall, p. 150.  
48 Whiteside, Preliminary Mss., pp. 29-33. 
49 Wrongly numbered, for the last two definitions are both labeled “def. 
18”. Whiteside, Preliminary Mss., p. 32. 
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DG50    DM 1 in med.51 
Locus    Locus 
Corpus   Quies 
Quies    motus 
Motus   velocitas 
-----    quantitas motus 
 
One will appreciate the shift from “corpus” to “quantitas motus” (to 
which “velocitas” is related), wherein the idea, voiced in the 
metaphysical part of DG, that body should be defined through the 
properties required for local motion alone, is at work. The notion of 
quantity of motion — which precedes the notion of absolute space52 
— is essential to the whole conceptual framework of the Principia. It 
is plain that the DM 2 manuscripts are basically but a further 
elaboration of what was accomplished in DM 1 — after it had been 
clarified and cleaned up by teaching about it at Cambridge for two 
years in the fall semesters of 1684 and 1685. Inasfar as the DM 
manuscripts are preliminary to PR I, DG thus functions as a joint 
between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Newton with respect to both physics 
and metaphysics. That is why I propose to consider DG eventually 
as the zero release to DM 1 & 2; a DM 0 so to say.53  
                                                
50 Hall & Hall, p. 91. 
51 Whiteside, Preliminary Mss., p. 30. 
52 This important point has been made with admirable clarity by Ori 
Belkind in his recent paper “Newton’s Conceptual Argument for Absolute 
Space”, International Studies in the Philosphy of Science, 21, 3, 2007, pp. 
271-293. Nevertheless I do not believe that Belkind’s analysis exhausts 
the whole question, for the argument of the stepwise bigger containers 
raises problems with respect to infinity (in fact it implies an argument 
against actual infinity), which I think is difficult to uphold with respect to 
Newton, for it would prevent him to make the cosmological leap which 
underpins the universality of the laws governing his system of the world. 
An inquiry into the consequences of the totalising leap into cosmology can 
be found in P. Kerzberg, Critique and Totality, SUNY Press, Albany, 1997.  
53 I thank Eric Schliesser for the suggestion to call DG a “zero release” to 
DM.   
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The small tract “Elements of Mechanicks” fits in this picture 
perfectly well. The structural element of the nineteen definitions is 
lifted out by the Halls themselves in their commentary.54 However, 
they believe it was written after the publication of the Principia. 
They deliver no argument for this except than that this view is more 
probable than the alternative one, that it was a synopsis of a work 
Newton intended to write.55 It will be clear that I do not share their 
opinion. The structural set-up it has in common with DG and DM 1 
points in another direction: that Newton at a certain moment did 
write up succinctly what he then thought should be the content of 
PR I. The fact that a question concerning harmonic motion raised by 
Mersenne has not been retained does not count, for it pertains to 
the pendulum problem, a subject he did treat extensively in PR I. 
Revealingly enough the content of the later Book II (the chapter on 
fluid mechanics) is almost completely absent from this synopsis, 
while the essence of Book III, the system of the world based on the 
new mechanics, figures prominently. This again is confirmed by the 
close relationship between the text on comets and a 1685 
manuscript De Mundi Systemate56 that was originally intended to 
become the second (eventually the third) book of the first Principia: 
 
The closest parallels are found in the work drafted in early 1685 
that he originally intended to be the second book of the Principia, 
but that was only published posthumously as Newton’s System of 
the World.57  
                                                
54 Hall & Hall, pp. 85-86. 
55 Hall & Hall, p. 86. 
56 The original title of the ms. being De motu corporum liber secundus. 
The change of the title presumably was the work of J. Conduitt; according 
to Cohen in the introduction to his facsimile edition of the English 
translation: I. Newton, A Treatise of the System of the World, I.B. Cohen 
(ed.), Dawsons of Pall Mall, London, 1969, p. xi. 
57 Ruffner, p. 262. The fate of the System of the World is in itself 
interesting, and has been discussed by Cohen in his introduction to his 
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One will remember that Book III of the Principia ends with 
propositions dealing with the trajectories of comets, and comets are 
at the heart of the “Mechanical Frame of the world” in the 
Elements.58 It is rather arbitrary to state that the problems listed 
towards the end of Elements are the loose ends left by PR I (as Hall 
& Hall do), because several of them have been solved completely, 
others partially in the course of it. It is therefore safe to place the 
Elements in between DM 1 & 2 and the Treatise of the System of 
the World. 
 
The first Principia: a text in transition 
 
But PR I is itself in many respects a text still very much in 
transition, and on matters fundamental, even though its true 
importance was immediately perceived by Newton’s peers.59 The 
received story for the origin of the first Principia basically runs as 
follows: it was written on instigation of the then secretary of the 
Royal Society, Edmund Halley, as a reply to his inquiries into the 
                                                                                                                                      
facsimile edition. The latin original can be found in: S. Horsley (ed.), 
Isaaci Newtoni Opera quae extant omnia, Londini: exc. Joannes Nichols, 
1889. 
58 Hall & Hall, pp. 167-168. 
59 Newton’s peers perceived the Principia from the start as an attempt to 
replace Descartes, whether they considered the attempt succesful or not. 
Witness Huygens to Leibniz (in a discussion on motus verus: Je vous diray 
seulement, que dans vos notes sur des Cartes j’ay remarqué que vous 
croiez absonum esse nullum dari motum realem, sed tantum relativum. 
Ce que pourtant je tiens pour tres constant, sans m'arrester au 
raissonement et experiences de Newton dans ses Principes de 
Philosophie, que je scay estre dans l'erreur, et j'ay envie de voir s'il ne 
se retractera pas dans la nouvelle edition de ce livre, que doit procurer 
David Gregorius. Des Cartes n’a pas assez entendu cette matiere. C. 
Huygens, OH X, n° 2854, p. 614. Huygens’s reasons for this, by the 
editeurs of the Oeuvres Complètes (in ft 47, on the same page) rightlfully 
labelled, “assertion remarquable'' with respect to Newton’s Principia have 
to remain undiscussed here, but will be the subject matter of a 
forthcoming paper. 
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precise connection between planetary orbits and the inverse square 
law.60 I do not want to alter anything to this story’s content, only to 
its interpretation: I say it does not describe the beginning but the 
end of the gestation of the first Principia. Indeed I even believe that 
Halley’s visits to a certain extend led to a premature birth. Not in 
the sense that the content and mathematical elaboration of the De 
Motu, the theory of motion at the heart of the Principia’s first Book, 
leaves anything to be desired. But in the sense that both its 
methodological implications and its links to the systema mundi were 
not yet thought through all of their consequences entirely. Cohen’s 
unique study on the rôle of hypotheses in Newton’s natural 
philosophy sheds light on the conceptual gap between PR I and PR 
II & III.61 I think I can contribute to bridging that gap by placing PR 
I in a different light. Newton notoriously starts Book III with a set of 
“Regulae Philosophandi”. This set, however, only pops up in the 
second edition of the Principia (1713). In PR I, Book III starts with a 
series of “Hypotheses”, of which only one survives into PR II, while 
the first two hypotheses change clothes and become the first two 
regulae. Now the interesting thing is that there is an intermediate 
phase in the early 1690s when Newton had not yet changed his 
“Hypotheses” into “Regulae” — a far from innocent adaptation62 — 
but did change the content of “Hypothesis III”. Cohen discusses the 
editorial changes63 made by Newton at the beginning of Book III 
and says that, to his surprise, Newton added — in the crucial and 
                                                
60 I.B. Cohen, Introduction, 41 sq. 
61 I.B. Cohen, “Hypotheses in Newton’s Philosophy”, Physis, VIII, 1966, 
pp. 163-184. 
62 Le changement de terminologie s’eplique, sans doute, par l’aversion 
croissante de Newton contre les hypothèses ainsi que par un certain 
glissement dans la signification qu’il attribue à ce terme. Dans la première 
édtion des Princpia il lui donne le sens traditionel — admission ou 
supposition fondamentale d’une théorie. A. Koyré, “Les Regulae 
Philosophandi”, Archives internationales d’histoire des sciences, vol. V, 
1960, pp. 3-14. 
63 One can consult the apparatus criticus to the Cohen-Koyré variorum 
edition of Book III, vol. II, pp. 550-555. 
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mentally demanding period 1692-9364 — during his revision of PR I 
a Hypothesis IV which he did not himself believe: 
 
Newton enlarged the number of “hypotheses” and included a 
mutually contradictory “Hypoth. III” and “Hypoth. IV”, of which 
the former was a statement of his own position (later printed as 
“Regula Philosophandi III”), and the latter was decribed as the 
doctrine of the Aristotelians and the Cartesians.”65  
 
Indeed, who would believe such a thing? The solution is methinks 
simple however, even if Cohen dismisses it a priori. In 1687 Newton 
either still believed, or at least was still in dubio of Hypothesis IV 
(III in the first Principia). We do know for certain he believed in it 
up to 1679, for he speaks of his conception of aether related to it in 
his letter to Boyle as (...) one conjecture (...) about the cause of 
gravity. For this end I will suppose aether to consist of parts 
differing from one another in subtlety by indefinite degrees.66 
Newton did not only change his mind between the first and the 
second edition about the meaning of the words “hypothesis” and 
“phaenomenon”, as Cohen points out; he changed as well his 
position of the cause of gravity. Cohen’s assertion about Hypoth. IV 
is furthermore flatly contradicted by a letter containing the detailed 
comments Newton had on Huygens’s De la Cause de la Pesanteur 
(OH XXI), passed on by Fatio De Duillier67 to a correspondent: 
                                                
64 In which period he appears to have been  calling many things into 
question. Cfr. e.g. the letters to Bentley, or the exchanges with Fatio De 
Duillier concerning the second edition Fatio envisaged to prepare. The 
Bentley-letters are reprinted in Cohen-Schofield, pp. 271-312 (with an 
introduction by Perry Miller). 
65 Cohen, “Hypotheses”, p. 164. 
66 Letter to Boyle, in I.B. Cohen and R.E. Schofield, Isaac Newton’s Papers 
and Letters on Natural Philosophy and related documents, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1958, p. 253. 
67 Fatio De Duillier met Newton at last in 1687, during his first visits to the 
Royal Society, of which he became a member in 1688. He was in that 
period a close friend of both Newton and Huygens, as well as an 
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[concerning] Pag. 163 du Traité de Mr Hugens: Monsr Newton est 
encore indeterminé entre ces deux sentiments. Le premier que la 
cause de la pesanteur soit inherente dans la matière par un Loi 
immédiate du Créateur de l'Univers et l'autre que la Pesanteur soit 
produite par la cause Mechanique que j'en ai trouvée.68  
 
                                                                                                                                      
aquaintance to Leibniz. He announces the publication of Newton’s Principia 
to Huygens three weeks in advance [Fatio to Huygens (24 June 1687; 
2465, OH IX, P. 167 sq.]: Je me suis trouvé trois fois à la Societé roiale 
ou j’ay entendu proposer tantôt d’assez bonnes choses et tantôt d’assez 
mediocres. Quelques uns des Messieurs qui la composent sont 
extrèmement prévenus en faveur d’un livre de Monsr. Newton qui 
s’imprime presentement et qui se debitera dans trois semaines d’ici. Il 
m’ont reproché qui je j’étois trop Cartesien et m’ont fait entendre que 
depuis les meditations de leur auteur toute la Physique étoit bien 
changée. These relations are evidenced by a ms. “Ex Epistola cujusdam 
ad Amicum”, which contains a precursor to the claims against Leibniz in 
the commercium epistolicum, in: J. Edleston, Correspondence of Sir Isaac 
Newton and Professor Cotes, including letters of other eminent man, now 
first published from the originals in the Library of Trinity college, 
Cambrdige; together with an appendix, containing other unpublished 
letters and papers by Newton, J.W. Parker, London, 1850, pp. 308-309.  
On this enigmatic and influential figure there is surprisingly few literature. 
A recent article fills the lacuna at least to a certain extend: S. 
Mandelbrote, “The Heterodox Career of Nicolas Fatio De Duillier”, in: J. 
Brooks and I Maclean, Heterodoxy in Early Modern Science and Religion, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 263-296. The 19th century 
biography by Wollf remains worth reading: R. Wollf, Fatio de Duillier. 
Biographien zur Kulturgeschichte der Schweiz 4, Verlag von Drell, Sükli & 
Comp., 1862, pp. 67-87. 
68 Fatio à W. De Beyrie, pour Leibniz [1694], n° 2853, OH X, pp. 605-608. 
This is true beyond question, witness a manuscript in Newton’s hand 
published by the Halls, the draft of a scholium on corr. 4 and 5 of prop. 
VI, Book III, where we read: Huius autem generis Hypothesis est unica 
per quam gravitas explicari potest, eamque geometra ingeniosissimus 
D.N. Fatio primus excogitavit. Hall & Hall, p. 313. Fatio’s final claim, 
although relevant, cannot be discussed here, but will be the subject of 
another paper on Huygens’s viewpoint on the nature of gravity, and its 
influence on Newton. The letter is reprinted in C. Huygens, Oeuvres 
Complètes de Christiaan Huygens, La Société Hollandaise des Sciences, 
J.A. Vollgraff et al. (eds.), 22 vols., Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1888-
1950 (OH in what follows). Bopp in his edition of Fatio’s De la Pesanteur 
gives in his introduction an overview of the exchange between Newton, 
Huygens and Fatio in this rspect (see our ftn. 66). Cohen in his 
Introduction dicsusses the textual material extant concerning the 
collaboration Newton-Fatio, o.c., pp.  
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The first “sentiment” is a perfect summary of the idea Newton 
developed already in DG, and pointing forward to formulations in 
the Scholium Generale to the second and third editions. The second 
possibility refers to a mechanical model Fatio had developed himself 
on the basis of Cartesian vortices, but without the fatal Cartesian 
aequivalence of matter and space. Fatio’s model was for a short 
while being considered as a serious candidate for the causal 
explanation of gravity on both sides of the Channel, by Newton as 
well as by Huygens and Leibniz: With Fatio’s prompting, he 
reconsidered the possibility that some sort of subtle matter or 
aether might be responsible for the effects of gravity.69 During the 
early 1690s, Newton indeed kept open the possibility that a vacuum 
is not incompatible with a form of atomistic mechanism in which 
material dispersion is extremely rare.70 Thus the vacuum of the 
scholia to the defintions in Book I, PR I did not at first prevent him 
to stick to a methodological Hypothesis III of plainly mechanical 
import. 
 
The new Hypothesis III (which became Rule III) was introduced in 
order to justify the universal gravitation of all bodies in proportion 
to the quantity of matter which they severally contain and (...) 
also served to justify discussions concerning the impenetrability 
                                                
69 S. Mandelbrote, Footprints of the lion. Isaac Newton at work, Cambridge 
University press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 91. 
70 Cfr. ft 8 to letter n° 2570 (Fatio to Huygens-1690) in OH IX, p. 387. 
Fatio had written in his own Pesanteur, dating from 1691: Gold contains 
more void than substance. Water and glass are dense materials, and yet 
they are almost totally transparent to the passage of light. It is 
conceivable that all solids could allow almost free passage to sufficiently 
small particles. Traces of a like argument can be found in  the  scholium 
to corrollary VI in the first edition of the Principia. See N. Fatio de Duillier, 
“De la cause de la Pesanteur”, in K. Bopp (ed.), Drei Untersuchungen zur 
Geschichte der Mathematik, Schriften der Straburger Wissenschaftlichen 
Gesellschaft in Heidelberg, Berlin & Leipzig, pp.19-66, 1929 [1701]. 
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and the atomic (or, more accurately, particulate) structure of 
matter.71  
 
Rule III72 in the second edition of PR methodologically encapsulates 
the ideas on material qualities Newton had already tentatively 
formulated in the De Gravitatione73, but apparently only now 
managed to implement succesfully on the level of his methodology. 
This complies with the timing Schaffer gives for Newton’s 
“reworking the initial definitions to the Principia on transmutation of 
matter”.74 There are more textual indications to support this 
interpretation. Gregory mentions around 1706 that he saw a (long 
awaited!) revised copy for the planned new edition of the Principia 
wherein the “Hypotheses” are changed into “Rules”,75 and we still 
owe the copy in which these corrections have been made. But the 
latter ascription only appears in the 1713 second edition of PR.76 
                                                
71 I.B. Cohen, “Hypotheses”, p. 175. An intermediate version was copied 
by Fatio directly from Newton’s manuscript and taken to Huygens, who 
passed it on to Leibniz... id., p. 174. 
72 Qualitates corporum quae intendi & remitti nequeunt, quaeque 
corporibus omnibus competunt, in quibus experimenta instituere licet, pro 
qualitatibus corporum universorum habendae sunt. A. Koyré and I.B. 
Cohen (eds.), Isaac Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica, The Third Edition (1726) with variant readings, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1972 (the “variorum” edition), vol. II, p. 
552. 
73 He defines body by means of “sensible abstraction” through the 
properties required for local motion alone. An apparently crucial point, for 
he comes back to it: Thus I have deduced a description of this corporeal 
nature from our faculty of moving our bodies, so that all the difficulties of 
the conception may at length be reduced to that (Hall & Hall, p. 141). (He 
should add that an analogy between our minds and Divine mind is implicit 
in his argument.) 
74 Schaffer, o.c., p. 219. 
75 Cohen, Introduction, pp. 195-196. Also S. P., Rigaud, Historical Essay 
on the First Publication of Sir Isaac Newton's Principia, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1838, p. 98 sq. 
76 With an intermediary stage to be found in an addendum to Gregory’s 
Notae in which the new Hypothesis III (not yet turned into “Regula III”; 
see Cohen, Introduction, p. 190-191) goes with a comment pertaining to 
the old one, stressing the different positions the Catersians and the 
Peripatetics would take wit regard to it, given their different views on the 
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With respect to metaphysics, the same pattern arises: only in PR II 
& III Newton conceptually achieves the final and decisive refutation 
of Cartesian vortices, and thus the full and complete 
implementation of the ideas set out already in DG: 
 
 (...) his main argument against these vortices, put forward 
forcefully in the second and third edition of both the Principia and 
the Opticks, emphasized the ineliminability of the inertial effects of 
the fluid.77  
 
But an interesting intermediary stage is again the (evidently earlier) 
manuscript which contains the praise for Fatio’s ideas on gravity’s 
cause. There we read: 
 
 For if (...) a certain subtle matter divided into least particles were 
uniformly scattered through the empty spaces of the heavens and 
filled as much of their thousandth part; a,d if the bodies of Planets 
or Comets or other globes were solid and destitute of all pores: 
these (by Prop XL book II and corol. 2) would lose a thousandth 
part of their motion (...) And it is reasonable that in a heaven 
more filled with matter, they would lose a lager part of their 
motion in proportion to the density, and even more if they were 
not solid bodies. Whence Comets, which pass through the 
planetary heavens (...) in all directions would soon lose their 
motions , and balls of lead shot from guns would very quickly stop 
unless the spaces of the heaven and of air were nearly vacuous.78  
 
Note the link with the problem of cometary motion. The same 
                                                                                                                                      
unity of matter: en effet, la troisième, celle justement qui affirmait l’unité 
de la matière, disparut et fut remplacé par autre chose. Koyré, o.c., p. 5. 
Cohen in his comment on Hyp. III as it occurs in PR I does not take this 
into account; “Hypotheses”, p. 171.  
77 G.W. Smith, “Was wrong Newton bad Newton?” in: J.Z. Buchwald, A. 
Franklin, Wrong for the Right reasons, Springer, Dordrecht, 2005, p. 154. 
78 Because of its length, I chose to cite the fragment in the English 
translation, which I took from Hall & Hall, pp. 315-316.  
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empirical phaenomena are thus differently explained in different 
periods of Newton’s lifetime.  Thus it is only in the second Principia 
that Newton’s conceptual evolution reaches its apex, in that the 
methodological claims and the metaphysical stance are finally made 
to match completely.79 The stage is now set for the 
Götterdämmerung with mechanical philosophy as a whole, and 
especially with its foremost representative, Leibniz, again on the 
two fronts of methodology (in the priority debate80) and 
metaphysics (in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence81). But that is 
another, well documented story.  
                                                
79 This same point — approached from another perspective — is also made 
in A. Shapiro’s article on Newton’s experimental philosophy, cited above. 
80 Initiated, not incidentially, by Fatio De Duillier, in his tract on the 
brachiostome published by the Royal Society in 1699. See N. Guicciardini, 
o.c., p. 178. The backgrounds of conflict are described in D. Bertoloni 
Meli, Equivalence and Priority. Newton versus Leibniz, Clarendon, Oxford, 
1993.  
81 H.G. Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence: Together wiith 
Extracts from Newton's Principia and Opticks, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1998.  
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Conclusion 
 
Newton should be understood as fundamentally severing the link 
between varous speculative — including traditional metaphysical 
— issues and the development of empirical science.82  
 
This is true only to a certain extend. In its full consequences it only 
becomes reality for the generations after him. It was not even true 
in the same way throughout Newton’s own scientific career. 
Newton’s own intentions remained embedded within an intellectual 
universe where 
 
philosophy, especially metaphysics and epistemology, the physical 
sciences, and even theology — were interwoven into one 
overacrhing field called natural philosophy. Hence to treat Newton 
as a philosopher in a historically accurate way might be to treat 
him as a natural philosopher.83  
 
I believe I showed in the foregoing that this point of view, taken as 
a methodological maxim, translates into the requirement to read 
Newton’s conceptual evolution in the area of natural philosophy in 
close relation to his developments in physics and celestial 
mechanics, and moreover, that a full appreciation of the one is 
impossible without an understanding of the other. Given the key 
rôle Newton’s basic concepts played in the origin of what we call to-
day modern science, I conclude with the afterthought that we 
cannot a priori exclude that this fact might continue to reverberate 
into its realm up to the present. 
                                                
82 A. Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2008, p. 42. 
83 A. Janiak, o.c., pp. 8-10. 
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